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I. The Role of Theory in Guiding Work on the Economics of Crime 
 
Much of the work on the economics of crime in recent years centers on intriguing public 
policy issues ranging from the reexamination of the impact of criminal sanctions on felonies and 
white collar crimes to new insights about the relevance of other means of crime prevention and 
deterrence such as job training and gun regulation. There has also been much attention paid to 
searching for instrumental variables that could in principle improve the identification of the 
causal effects of critical policy variables. This has indeed been a principal theme of the literature 
on the economics of crime since the early 1970s (see the “three equation econometric model” in 
Ehrlich 1973, 1974, 1975, Ehrlich and Brower, 1987 and Ehrlich and Liu, 1999). The 
econometric literature offers alternative approaches to overcoming the identification of the 
effects ascribed to causal factors, which range from classical econometric techniques to semi-
experimental design methodologies. While search for valid instruments is a critical ingredient in 
improving our understanding of how to reduce crime in our free society, it is also important to 
point out that a better understanding of the role of causal factors rests not just on the choice of 
econometric techniques, but also on a more comprehensive accounting for the basic economic 
and institutional factors underlying the incidence of specific crimes (see McAleer, Pagan and 
Volker, 1985, Ehrlich and Liu, 1999). In this paper we wish to illustrate the relevance of theory 
in guiding empirical work and deriving related policy implications by extending and applying 
what one of us has dubbed the “market for offenses” model.  
The essence of the market model is the interaction between public law enforcement and 
private self-protection by individuals. Accounting for such interaction in the context of a market 
model helps to understand better the determinants of the supply of crime by offenders, on the 
hand, and the demand for safety, or the derived (inverse) demand for crime by potential victims,   3
on the other. The point has been stressed in Ehrlich (1981), which illustrates the relevance of the 
interaction between supply and demand forces in determining equilibrium in the virtual market 
for offenses, and the implications this may have on the relative efficacy and efficiency of 
alternative means of crime control, such as rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence.  
In this paper we attempt to illustrate the additional insights such approach may yield by 
applying it to the association between crime and guns. The seminal work on this issue has been 
Lott and Mustard (1997). Their work draws attention to a relatively neglected issue: the role of 
guns as self-protection by potential victims. The market model of crime may indeed be of 
particular importance in pursuing the relevance of regulation and law enforcement in reducing 
the volume of crime, or guns, or both. We are not aware, however, of attempts to purse this line 
of attack on the problem so far. We attempt to do so through fairly simple extensions of the 
model which link the markets for crime and guns. 
Our point of reference is that guns serve as means of self-protection by potential victims, 
but also as factors of production for offenders, by increasing the expected gains from criminal 
activity. Gun regulations, which generally increase the full costs of acquiring guns to all users, 
can have mixed effects on the incidence of crime. Our analysis offers some new insights 
concerning the efficacy of both gun regulation and law enforcement in reducing crime and gun-
holding, and also about how to trace the relevant effects empirically. 
We start with a short outline of the market for offenses model, and then expand it to 
incorporate the dual markets for crime and guns under both competitive and non-competitive 
market structures. We conclude with some remarks about the policy implications of our analysis 
and the insights it offers about the design and implementation of further empirical studies into 
the interaction between offense and defense in the virtual markets for offenses.   4
II. A General Illustration of the Single Market Model 
In the market for offenses model (Ehrlich 1981, 1996), the equilibrium flow of offenses 
results from the interaction between the aggregate supply of offenses, direct or derived demand 
for offenses by potential victims, and public law enforcement, which operates like a tax on 
criminal activity. Some behavior classified as crime, such as prostitution and consumption of 
illicit drugs, involves the interaction between suppliers and consumers in an explicit market 
setting. But even crimes against persons and property can be analyzed in the context of a virtual 
market that involves the interaction between offenders and potential victims. This happens 
through the latter’s demand for self-protection, which creates a negative demand for crime. In 
“markets for offenses” involving material gains, equilibrium establishes a simultaneous solution 
for the volume of crime, the optimal levels of law enforcement and private protection by 
potential victims, and the net return per offense. 
1  
A.  The “market” concept and equilibrium 
For the sake of a simple illustration, consider two specialized population groups of large 
numbers which are homogeneous within groups: offenders and potential victims. Offenders seek 
to appropriate wealth owned by potential victims, and the latter demand protection for their 
wealth. For simplicity we assume that offenses are of a uniform type (there is a single virtual 
market), all individuals are risk neutral, and the groups are distinguished by income levels: 
offenders have poorer legitimate earning opportunities and lower wealth initially as well as in 
any equilibrium involving participation in crime. The purpose of self-protection by potential 
victims is to increase the costs of appropriation to the offenders so as to reduce their incentive to 
commit crime. Formally, the model can be described as follows:   5
(1)  q
s = S(π), 
This equation represents the aggregate supply of offenses, Q,  normalized in terms of their 
frequency in the population, N, or the “crime rate” q = Q/N, such that S’(π) ≥ 0. The inside term, 
π, in turn, is defined by the net gain to the offender per offense: 
(2)  π = d – pf,  
where d = (wi − wl) − c stands for the differential gain per offense – the loot, wi , less opportunity 
cost of time per offense, wl , less the direct cost the offender incurs from committing crime, the 
major one perhaps being to overcome the various form of resistance by the potential victim, c, 
which we call self-protection. The higher the self-protection the lower is the differential loot. 
This can be formalized through the function d = d(I), with d’(I) ≤ 0. Furthermore, optimal self-
protection expenditure rises with the magnitude of the potential private loss from crime and the 
probability of becoming a victim, which under rational expectations can be equated with the 
actual crime rate, q, or I = I(q). This can be shown to establish a “tolerance for crime” function, 
which is derived from the willingness of potential victims to self-protect against crime. The 
higher the risk of victimization, the higher is self-protection spending, and the lower becomes the 
differential reward to the offender. The tolerance, or “derived demand”, for offenses can thus be 
generally specified by: 
(3)  d = D(q
d)  with D’(q) ≤ 0, as d’(I) ≤ 0 and I’(q) ≥  0.   
Society resists crime collectively as well as individually by enforcing the law to increase 
the prospect of apprehending and punishing offenders. The expected punishment τ = pf  thus acts 
like an added tax on criminal payoffs, bringing it down to the net payoff in equation (2). The   6
optimal magnitude of τ is derived by the law enforcement authority – the government – so as to 
minimize the social cost of crime, as detailed separately in the succeeding subsection: 
(4)  τ = pf = τ(q), such that τ’(q) ≥ 0. 




Equations (1) and (2) give the supply of offenses in terms of π: 
(5’)  q
s = S(d – pf). 
Therefore, by Eq. (3), given optimal enforcement, equilibrium is solved as a fixed-point problem:  
(6)  q
* = S[D(q
*) – pf]. 
The condition assuring the existence of equilibrium, or q
* ≥ 0, is D(0) – pf ≥ 0.  We can 
also prove that the equilibrium q
* is unique if the net reward from crime becomes negative as q 
rises above its equilibrium value, which is easily verified as dS(π)/dq = D’(q) S’(π) < 0. 
This algebraic solution can be derived diagrammatically using a four-quadrant chart 
(Figure 1). The lower-right quadrant depicts the optimal self-protection function I(q) as an 
increasing function of the probability of victimization, or the crime rate, q. The impact of self-
protection on the differential reward per offence is depicted in the lower left quadrant by curve 
d’d’. The auxiliary 45-degree line in the upper left quadrant maps the lower left quadrant onto 
the upper right quadrant to produce the (negative) derived demand for crime, or the tolerance for 
crime, by potential victims dd. The supply of offenses function is given by S(π). Finally, the 
optimal tax function τ = pf sets the equilibrium solutions for π
* and q
* at point E. 
   7
B.  Optimal public enforcement and private protection 
While equation (6) holds for any given level of enforcement “tax”, the optimal law 
enforcement policy, like taxation, depends on the welfare function the law enforcement 
authority, i.e., the government, chooses to pursue. Economic models of optimal taxation typically 
produce solutions based in part on some normative considerations. In the seminal Becker (1968) 
approach, which much of the Law and Economics literature has adopted, the criterion for optimal 
enforcement has been based on maximization of social income. Becker has actually chosen a 
more direct concept – minimization of the social loss from offenses including three major 
components: the social costs of private losses to actual and potential victims of crime, the direct 
costs of law enforcement through apprehension, prosecution and conviction of suspected 
offenders, and the costs of punishing those convicted, which depend on the type of sanction 
imposed. These three elements are summarized by equation (7a) below. Note, however, that in 
our case the social value of the private losses per-capita include outlays on private self-protection 
in addition to all the private damages from offenses: 
(7a)  L = Δ(q) + C(q, pf) + b(t)pfq, 
where L denotes the total expected social losses per-capita (which can be taken to be known with 
certainty); q denotes the aggregate crime rate in the population; Δ(q) is the full social costs of 
private losses from crime per-capita; C(q, pf) is the direct costs of enforcement by police and 
courts; t is the index of the form of punishment used, which in this analysis is taken to be set by 
the institutions governing the legal system; b(t) is the multiplier transferring the offender’s 
expected private cost term pfq into the public cost measure, and b(t)qpf  is the per-capita costs of 
punishing those convicted
2. The components Δ and C are assumed to have the following 
properties: Δ(0) = 0,  Δ’(q) > 0; and C(q, 0) = C(0, τ) = 0, ∂C/∂q > 0, ∂C/∂τ > 0.   8
As for the government’s role, equation (5) would yield the market equilibrium solution 
corresponding to the optimal enforcement level pf as q
* = q(pf), such that q’(pf) < 0. Substituting 
q(pf) into equation (6), we obtain 
(7b)  L(pf) = Δ[q(pf)] + C[q(pf), pf] + b(t)q(pf)pf, 
which is minimized with respect to pf. Under the assumed set of assumptions, we can easily 
show that an interior solution for τ
* = (pf)
* exists and is unique, regardless of the interaction 
between public enforcement and private self-protection. This interior solution also solves for the 
other major endogenous variable in the market model – optimal self-protection, I
*(pf), and the 
consequent net reward to offenders per offence, π(pf).  
Under a stable equilibrium, it can be shown that any exogenous reduction in the marginal 
cost of enforcement (say a reduction in b(t) because of a lower social cost of the sanction 
imposed on convicted offenders) will lead to a higher optimal level of enforcement and a 
reduction in the crime rate, regardless of whether public and private protection (law enforcement 
and self-protection) are technical “substitutes” in the production of protective services. A similar 
result holds if the marginal cost of self-protection falls as a result of an exogenous advance in the 
technology of private protection. 
Proposition 1. Under the specification of the single market for offenses, if equilibrium exists and 
is unique, an exogenous reduction in the marginal cost of enforcement (say a lower b(t) would 
lead to an increase in the optimal level of law enforcement, pf, and lower the crime rate and 
private self-protection levels, regardless of whether public law enforcement and private self-
protection are independent, complements, or substitutes in the provision protective services. A 
corollary result holds in the case where the marginal cost of self-protection falls as a result of an 
exogenous technological advance.   9
Proof: In a unique and stable equilibrium, the initial level of law enforcement, τ0 = pf0, is optimal. 
Let law enforcement increase (dτ > 0) due, say, to a downward shift in the marginal cost of law 
enforcement. If public and private protection were independent in the provision of safety, this 
would not affect the optimal private self-protection schedule d(I
*), and hence the tolerance for 
crime schedule dd in Figure 1. Equilibrium q
* would fall along with the optimal level of self-
protection. The same result would occur if public and private protection were complements, 
since then a higher τ (more police on the street) would shift both the d(I
*) and dd schedules 
downward, reinforcing the effect of the higher τ on q
* and I
*. If public and private protection 
were substitutes, in contrast, both d(I
*) and dd would shift upward. By the maximum principle, 
however, q
* and thus the level of self-protection must still fall. If the net effect of a higher 
optimal τ were to raise q
*, this would be a contradiction to the optimality and stability of the 
initial equilibrium, since a solution in which q
* > q(0)
* was available at the initial equilibrium at 
a lower social cost corresponding to τ < τ(0). Thus q
* must fall as a result of a rise in optimal τ 
regardless of the interdependency between public and private protection. 
III. Extending the Model to Multiple Markets: Crime and Guns 
An important aspect of illegal activities is that they are often linked through different 
markets. Some illegal enterprises, such as illicit drugs and prostitution or counterfeiting and 
money laundering, are linked vertically, while other illegal endeavors are linked horizontally, like 
burglaries and fences. Little work has been done to date to tackle this issue, perhaps because 
such links may be minor in many cases. One example that stands out is the interaction between 
crime and guns, where the empirical literature has focused on the impact of the demand for 
handguns on what we model as the “derived demand” for related offenses.   10
Guns, and particularly handguns, offer an example of a self-protective device for potential 
victims of crime. At the same time, however, offenders often use guns as a means of increasing 
the prospect of a successful heist, or to protect the cash acquired through illegal transactions 
ranging from loan-sharking to human trafficking. In this section, we consider the interaction 
between the market for offenses and the market for guns in an attempt to throw some new light 
on controversies concerning the association between guns and crime. The analysis can also help 
compare the effectiveness of alternative policies of government intervention in these markets 
through gun regulations, such as the right to carry concealed weapons, or stiffer expected 
penalties, especially when these involve the use of guns. A reduction in gun holding in the 
population can be seen as an independent objective of public policy because it increases the 
safety of innocent victims from accidental gun shooting, even if the policy has no effect on crime. 
In the following analysis, however, we are not addressing the solutions for the optimal 
level of enforcement and regulations, since this requires the specification of a broader social loss 
function involving the sundry social costs arising from crime and gun holding, as well as 
arbitrary assumptions regarding the relative costs of raising the levels of regulation and law 
enforcement as alternative means of crime and gun control.  We can address without loss of 
generality, however, the effectiveness of marginal shifts in these policy variables on the two basic 
endogenous variables of the model – gun holding and the rate of crime – starting from an initial 
equilibrium solution presumed to involve optimal values of both. 
A.  Basic framework 
To analyze these issues we start with a simple extension of the single market for offenses, 
incorporating the market for guns. The assumptions underlying the analysis in section II and 
equations (1)-(7) provide the basic structure for the market for offenses. The supply and demand   11
sides of the market for guns, and the various possible channels through which the two markets 
interact, however, need to be identified and formalized before we proceed with the analysis.  
Our analysis treats gun holding by both offenders and victims as crime related. Therefore 
by “guns” we generally mean hand guns, not rifles which are used primarily for hunting. We 
recognize that markets for guns, especially those acquired by offenders, may operate as part of 
the underground economy, so the analysis would allow for separate submarkets which involve 
different transaction costs (see below). Modeling gun ownership in this fashion enables us to 
assess changes in regulation as a “regulation tax”, or a “tax on guns”, since it increases the 
marginal cost of acquiring a gun. The motivation for holding guns, however, is very different for 
the groups of offenders and potential victims. Offenders demand guns as “factors of production”,  
to secure a successful acquisition of the return from crime, i.e., its expected gross value, wi or the 
“loot” net of the opportunity cost of crime (wi – wl), which is the exogenous part of the 
differential gain from crime, d, in equation (2).  In contrast, potential victims demand guns as 
self-protection, to protect their property, or business, i.e., to increase the direct costs to offenders 
of successfully committing a crime, which works to reduce the differential gain to offenders, d.  
In the guns market, we denote the rates of gun holding by the separately homogeneous 
groups of potential victims and specialized offenders in a representative period as x and y, 
respectively. We specify the number of homogeneous potential victims and offenders as Nx > 0 
and Ny > 0 respectively, so Nx + Ny = N represents the total population. The aggregate demands 
for guns by potential victims and offenders are then given by X = Nx × x and Y = Ny × y, 
respectively. Since we model the groups as specialized, non-competing groups, x stands for the 
number of guns held by the representative potential victim, or the probability that a potential 
victim owns a gun, while y likewise stands for the probability that an offender holds a gun. In   12
this formulation, (Nx x+Ny y)/N measures the per-capita gun holding in the population, and x/y 
stands for the likelihood ratio of defensive over offensive gun holding.
3  
We consider the market for guns to be competitive with homogeneous firms producing 
guns via a constant-return-to-scale technology and constant raw material prices. If there are no 
separating unit taxes, such as registration fees, license fees, fines, and regulatory obligations, 
there would be just one effective price for guns, P0 = Px = Py. The market for guns, however, may 
be split between two submarkets – one for law abiding potential victims (primary) and one for 
offenders (secondary) – because of different transaction, or search and location costs, which are 
affected by regulation, Tx ≥ 0 and Ty ≥ 0. The “full” prices for X and Y would then be given by Px 
= P0 (Tx) and Py(Ty), respectively, where T (a fixed or ad-valorem “tax”) represents the impact of 
a “regulation-tax” on the “full” price of guns.  An important issue for our analysis is the way gun 
regulation affects the two submarkets. In general, the prices in these submarkets are linked 
simply because prices in the secondary (used guns’) market used by offenders should derive 
from prices charged in the primary (new guns’) market used by law abiders. But the linkage 
depends also on the type of regulation invoked. While licensing may affect mainly, or exclusively, 
law abiders, restrictions on the right to carry guns affect the full price of gun holding for all users. 
Although in the following analysis we invoke for convenience the “neutral” assumption that 
Px/Py is independent of regulation, we also allow for regulations affecting just Px but not Py.
4  
a.  Competitive dual-market model  
The markets for offenses and guns can be analyzed through a number of possible channels 
of interaction. We start with a basic channel linking guns to crime as competing instruments of 
self-protection by potential victims and offenders and assume that the markets for offenses and 
guns are “competitive”, i.e., neither offenders nor victims form organized groups. The only   13
organized activity is law enforcement, as in section II, and the law enforcement authority sets the 
optimal tax on crime, (pf)
* = τ
*, which offenders and potential victims take as given. The 
advantage of this “baseline” model is that it makes the least number of assumptions to guarantee 
the existence and uniqueness of the multi-market equilibrium. Yet some of the basic policy 
implications we derive from this model are quite general, as extensions of the model which 
recognize additional channels of interaction will demonstrate. 
Our point of reference is that guns in the hands of offenders (y) and potential victims (x), or 
alternatively the probabilities that the offender and victim hold a gun in a crime-related encounter, 
have offsetting effects on the likelihood of a successfully executed crime, and thus on the 
expected loot to the offender, wi, (or the differential loot d = wi – wl) which is also the expected 
loss to the potential victim from being victimized. To make this assumption operational, we need 
to explicitly specify the dependence of wi on the relative magnitudes of x and y. We will make the 
neutral assumption that wi, and hence the expected net return to the offender, π, depend on the 
likelihood ratio of defensive over offensive gun holding in a criminal encounter,
 5 r, and the level 
of per-capita wealth in the community, W, which we take to be exogenous to the model, or 
(15a)   wi = wi(r, W) and d = d(r, W), where 
(15b)  r = x/y = (Ny/Nx) × (X/Y).
  
The ratio r is determined, in turn, by the relative magnitudes of the aggregate demand for guns 
by offenders and victims. In this competitive setting, potential victims and offenders thus take r 
as given since they cannot control the market-determined r by individual action.
  
The next step in the analysis is to specify the demand functions for guns as self-
protection devices for potential victims and factors of production for offenders.  To simplify the 
analysis, we assume that guns represent the only means of self-protection by potential victims.   14
Their demand for guns will be affected by the price of guns for law abiders (Px), the probability 
of becoming a victim (v = q), and the magnitude of their loss if victimized wi = wi(r, W), as 
specified in equation (15a). This translates the I(q) function as stated in section II to a direct 
demand function for guns x
d = Gx(Px, q, wi).  A higher marginal cost of self-protection (here the 
unit price of guns) reduces its optimal value while a higher probability of victimization increases 
the desired self-protection, as does the potential loss to the victim which forms the offender’s 
gross loot. We can thus write the demand function in reduced form as follows:
6 
(16)   x
d = Gx(Px, q, r),  
with ∂x
d /∂Px < 0, ∂x
d /∂q > 0, and ∂x
d/∂r = (∂Gx/∂wi)(∂wi /∂r) < 0. 
Offenders, in contrast, demand guns to enhance their expected loot, wi. We thus assume 
implicitly that wi = f(y), with f’(y) > 0. The representative offender’s derived-demand for guns as 
a factor of production can thus be specified by the standard economic theory of derived-demand 
for factors of production as an indirect function of factor and product prices. In our case the unit 
price of guns is Py (the analog of c in equation 2), but the product price, which involves a crime, 
is the expected net return from crime π = d – τ, where d = wi – wl is the expected differential gain 
per offense and τ = pf is the expected criminal sanction.
7 Again, since the expected gross loot 
wi(r,W), and hence d(r,W) are functions of the potential victims’ wealth and the likelihood ratio 
of defensive over offensive gun holding in equation (15a), r, we can write the derived demand by 
offenders for guns in reduced form as  
(17)   y
d = Gy(Py, r, τ),  
with ∂y
d /∂Py < 0, ∂y
d /∂τ < 0, and ∂y
d /∂r = (∂y
d/∂d)(∂d/∂r) < 0, as ∂y
d/∂d > 0 and ∂d/∂r < 0.  
  The derived demand for offenses in equation (3) can now be specified as   15
(18)  d(r) = D(q
d|r), with d’(r) = ∂d/∂r < 0,    
and as in section II, for any given likelihood ratio of defensive over offensive gun holding, the 
market equilibrium condition solves the fixed-point problem:  
(19)  q
* = S[D(q
*|r) − τ],  
where ∂q/∂τ < 0 by our analysis in section II. Existence of equilibrium for any value of r and τ = 
pf is here assured by the condition D(0|r) − τ > 0. We tentatively denote the equilibrium point as 
(20a)  q
*(r) = q(τ, r). 
We next consider the market equilibrium solutions for gun holdings by potential victims 
and offenders. Since the guns’ supply curves are flat, the solutions are assured by the strong law 
of demand: the downward sloping demand curves for guns with respect to their shadow prices 
(given wealth). The equilibrium solutions in the markets for guns can be stated as:  
(20b)  r
* = r(Px, Py,  q) = Gx (Px, r, τ) / Gy (Py, r, τ). 
The dual-market equilibrium solution for the markets for crime and guns are thus given by  
(20c)  q
* = q (r
*; τ, Px, Py). 
b.  Policy implications: taxing guns versus taxing crime 
The impact of the policy variables entering equation (20a) and (20b) on the crime rate,  
the likelihood ratio of defensive over offensive gun holding (15a), and total gun holding in the 
population, which we treat implicitly as an independent policy objective, can now be obtained 
through total differentiation of these equations. By differentiating equation (20a), we obtain: 
(21a) dq
*/q
* = eq,τ dτ/τ + eq,r dr
*/r
*,  






*, we obtain   16
(21b) dr
*/r
* = (ex,q eq,τ dτ/τ – ey,τ dτ/τ – εx dPx/Px + εy dPy/Py)/(1– ex,r + ey,r – ex,qeq,r), 
where εx = − (∂x/∂Px)(Px/x) > 0 and εy = − (∂y/∂Py)(Py/y) > 0 denote the absolute price elasticities 
of demand for guns from equations (16) and (17), and the e terms entering equations (21a) and 
(21b) represent partial elasticities of the variable in their first subscript with respect to the second; 
e.g., eq,τ = (∂q/∂τ)(τ/q). The partial elasticities of the crime rate with respect to r and τ, eq,r < 0 and 
eq,τ < 0, are seen to be negative from equation (19). The signs of the partial elasticities of the 
demand for guns by potential victims and offenders with respect to the risk of victimization and 
the expected enforcement sanction, ex,q > 0 and ey,τ < 0, follow from equations (16) and (17), 
respectively. Also note that (ex,q eq,r) has a negative sign, while the partial effects of r on the 
demand for guns by the representative offender and victim respectively, ex,r < 0 and ey,r < 0 is 
also expected to be negative by equations (16) and (17), but the sum (– ex,r + ey,r) can be shown 
to be  necessarily less than unity.
8  
By combining equations (21a) and (21b) we can now derive the general condition 
governing shifts in the equilibrium crime rate by totally differentiating the crime rate with 
respect to the basic policy variables of the model: the tax on guns, and thus Px and Py, and the tax 
on crime, τ = pf. Expressed in terms of the condition for the crime rate to fall, or remain 
unchanged, from (21a) and (21b), we obtain 
(22a) –  dq
*/q
* ≥ 0  iff  (1 – ey,τ)dτ/τ – εx dPx/Px + εy dPy/Py ≥ 0.  
  Consider first the impact of the “taxing crime” policy {dτ > 0, dPx = 0, dPy = 0}. In this 
case, since ey,τ is negative, equation (22a) holds, implying that 
(22b) dq
*/dτ|dP=0 = ∂q
*/∂τ < 0. 
The inference then is that stiffer law enforcement unambiguously reduces the crime rate.   17
Moreover, a higher tax on crime policy can also be expected to unambiguously lower the 
equilibrium total gun holding in the population, (x
* + y
*). The rationale is that an increase in the 
expected penalty, τ, lowers the net gain from crime to the offender and thus the actual crime rate, 
q, as shown by equation (22b). The resulting partial effect on the demand for guns by offenders, y, 
is also negative, as indicated by equation (17). The initial decline in both the average probability 
of victimization q and the likelihood ratio of defensive gun holding in the population, r = x/y, 
lowers potential victims’ demand for self-protection, x, as seen from equation (16). The 
percentage decline of optimal x may even exceed that of optimal y, so ultimately the likelihood 
of defensive gun holding, r = x/y, may or may not rise in equilibrium, but this ambiguity occurs 
only because both potential victims and offenders hold less guns.
9 
Proposition 2. Under competitive markets for crime and guns, a stricter law enforcement policy 
unambiguously lowers both the crime rate and gun holding per offender and potential victim, 
and thus the total rate of gun holding in the population. 
Note that by proposition 2, we expect “less guns” to be associated with “less crime”. But the 
causal effect comes not necessarily from the impact of gun control, as we shall see below, but 
from stricter law enforcement against crime. 
  Consider now the impact of more stringent gun-control regulations on equilibrium gun 
holding. By totally differentiating equation (20c) under the policy package {dτ = 0, dPx > 0, dPy 
> 0}, we can easily show that a rise in Px, or Py alone would unambiguously lower the 
equilibrium values of x
* and y
*, respectively. However, while the cross effects of an increase in 
Py on x
* is to decrease the latter’s value, that of Px on y
* is ambiguous. This is essentially because 
when the price faced by offenders alone, Py, rises, its direct effect is to decrease the optimal gun 
holding by offenders, y
*, which raises the market level of the likelihood ratio r
* = x
*/y
* faced by   18
potential victims. Since the higher r lowers the expected loss to potential victims, wi, the latter’s 
optimal self-protection, thus the demand for guns, x
*, fall as well (ex,r < 0 in equation 16). The 
net effect of the increase in Py is thus to decrease the equilibrium value of total gun holding, i.e., 
d(x
* + y
*)/dPy < 0, when {dPx = dτ = 0}. In contrast, when the price of guns faced by potential 
victims alone, Px, rises, its direct effect is to lower gun holding by law abiders, x, which lowers 
the equilibrium level of the likelihood ratio of gun holding r = x/y. faced by offenders. This, in 
turn, raises the offenders’ differential gain from crime and thus their derived demand for guns, y
*. 
The sign of d(x
* + y
*)/dPx when {dPy = dτ  = 0} is thus ambiguous. A more stringent gun 
regulation that raises proportionally the full price of guns for all users, i.e., dPx/Px = dPy/Py = 
dP/P, therefore also has an ambiguous effect on total gun holding in the population.
10 
  Similarly, whether regulations can reduce the crime rate in this competitive setting cannot 




*. If regulation has an equal proportional impact on the price of guns, then the 
effect on r
* will depend strictly on the price elasticity of demand for guns by each group. This is 
seen from equations (21a) and (21b): dq
*/dP|dτ=0 = ∂q
*/∂P < 0, e.g., requires that dr
*/dP|dτ=0 = 
∂r




*, which can be stated as follows: ∂q
*/∂P < 0 iff εy > εx. 
Proposition 3.  Under competitive markets for crime and guns, a more stringent gun regulation 
that raises the full price of guns to either offenders or potential victims separately 
unambiguously lowers the equilibrium gun holding by each group, respectively. If a more 
stringent regulation raises proportionately the full price of guns to all users, however, the impact 
on total gun holding will be ambiguous. Such increase in regulation also has ambiguous effects 
on the crime rate, depending on the price elasticities of demand for guns by potential victims and 
offenders. If offenders have a less elastic demand, stricter regulation will lower the crime rate.   19
The outcome will be reversed if potential victims have a less elastic demand.  
Of course, if stiffer gun regulations, such as licensing requirements, affect just the primary 
market’s full-price for guns where potential victims shop, but does not impact at all the (illegal) 
secondary market’s price of guns where offenders shop, this is tantamount to εx > εy = 0 in 
equation (24). In this case, stiffer gun regulations will unambiguously increase the crime rate. 
IV. Extended Model with Strategic Interactions 
  Our modeling of the markets for crime and guns in section III has not allowed for any 
strategic interactions between offenders and potential victims on the grounds that the market was 
purely competitive. Specifically, we have assumed that neither has the power to control the 
likelihood ratio of gun holding, r. However, the two groups may interact with each other if 
individuals in each group develop rational expectations about the decisions of the other group to 
hold guns, or if the two groups were actually organized. Examples of informal organizations 
include neighborhood crime watch and volunteer crime patrol groups, or neighborhood alliances 
on the part of potential victims, and gangs or criminal organizations on the part of offenders. The 
potential of strategic reactions by offender’s or victim’s groups is important for our analysis 
since it implies an ability to control the likelihood ratio of guns holding, the expected net reward 
from crime, π = d – pf, and hence the prevalence of both crime and guns in the population. It can 
also set additional limits on the efficacy of public policy to control crime and guns. 
To formally accommodate the existence of such interactions, we restate the demand 
functions for guns in equations (16) and (17) as follows: 
(23a)  x
d = Gx(Px, y, q), 
(23b)  y
d = Gy(Py, x, τ), where τ = pf.   20
These equations indicate the fundamental difference between this extended model and the purely 
competitive model of Section III. While in Section III, all agents take the likelihood ratio of 
defensive gun holding as exogenously given, in this section the likelihood ratio is an endogenous 
variable. Indeed, the underlying purpose of strategic reactions is to control r.  
Equations (23a) and (23b) introduce strategic interactions specified as complementary 
reactions that are consistent with cost minimizing behavior for a given differential gain from 
crime, ∂Gy/∂x > 0 and ∂Gx/∂y > 0. The potential victims group will thus react to any partial 
increase in the number of guns held by the other group by increasing their own holdings. If a 
stable equilibrium exists, however, the reactions by offenders and victims must converge. As 
Figure 2 shows, the conditions for such convergence require that 
(24a)  ∂Gy/∂x < 1/(∂Gx/∂y) or equivalently ex ey < 1, 
where e’s are elasticities of strategic responses defined by  
(24b)   ex = (∂Gx/∂y) (y/x) ≥ 0 and ey = (∂Gy/∂x) (x/y) ≥ 0. 
In Figure 2 we also prove that if the stability condition (24) holds, it implies not just that the 
product of the elasticities ex ey must be less than unity, but also the magnitude of each elasticity 
must be less than unity, because by the stability conditions ∂Gy/∂x < y/x < 1/(∂Gx/∂y), which in 
turn imply that ex ≤ 1 and ey ≤ 1. These results can be formally stated as follows:  
Lemma 1. A stable strategic interaction between the groups of offenders and victims requires 
that ex, ey ≤ 1 with ex ey < 1.  
The system explored in this extension is technically that of section III, the main 
difference being that we add strategic parameters to the demand for guns functions. Specifically, 
the equilibrium solution for the crime rate is still characterized by equations (19) and (20a). But   21
the equilibrium solution for the likelihood ratio of defensive gun holding in equation (21a) is 
here modified as follows: 
(25)  r
* = r(Px, Py, x
*, y
*, q




A. Policy insights 
Having described the equilibrium solutions for q
* and r
*, we can evaluate the impact of 
policy changes on the magnitudes of these variables, and indirectly the total amount of guns held 
by the population, through the standard analysis of comparative statics. For computational 
convenience, we will measure the effects of policies on offenses, the likelihood ratio of gun 
holding, and the per-capita level (or probability) of gun holding by potential victims and 









We assume that potential victims and offenders are “organized”, and thus have positive 
strategic-reaction elasticities ex ≥ 0 and ey ≥ 0. By totally differentiating q
* and r
* and solving the 
system of linear equations, we obtain the condition for the crime rate to decline as follows: 
(26)   dq
*/q
* = eq,r {[(1 – exey)(eq,τ/eq,r) – ey,τ] dτ/τ – (1 – ey)εx dPx/Px + (1 – ex)εy dPy/Py} 
× {(1 – exey) – (1 – ey)ex,q eq,r]}
−1 < 0. 
We first consider the policy {dτ > 0, dPx = dPy = 0}, i.e., increasing law enforcement 
against crime with no change in regulations. The impact of this policy can be assessed from 
equations (26). Since dτ/τ > 0, the sign of ∂q
*/∂τ can be determined by evaluating the sign of dq/q 
in equation (26). Since dPx/Px = dPy/Py = 0, and given the strategic stability condition ex, ey < 1 in 
Lemma 1, it can be immediately seen that condition (26) is satisfied. Therefore, ∂q
*/∂τ  < 0. 
By totally differentiating (23a) and (23b), we can also show that any increment in our 
basic policy variables – law enforcement, (raising τ), or gun regulations (raising all gun prices   22
proportionately) – lowers the equilibrium gun holdings for both law abiders and offenders, or 
∂x
*/∂τ < 0 and ∂y
*/∂τ < 0. Furthermore, by totally differentiating equation (26) with respect to τ 
we can show that stricter law enforcement raises the likelihood ratio of gun holding, ∂r
*/∂τ. 
These results are summarized in the next proposition. 
Proposition 4.  As in the competitive model, a higher tax on crime, with no change in regulations, 
reduces both the crime rate and total gun holding in the population if we allow for strategic 
interactions between offenders and potential victims. In this case, the likelihood ratio of 
defensive gun holding, r, also declines unambiguously.  
Proposition 4 restates the message of Proposition 3. The only difference is that under 
strategic interactions, a larger expected punishment lowers the incentive to hold guns especially 
by potential victims. This is because in the “competitive” model, the diminished incentive for 
potential victims to engage in self-protection comes strictly from the fall in the crime rate (the 
probability of being victimized). Under strategic interactions, in contrast, potential victims react 
not just to the fall in the crime rate, but also to the reduction in the demand for guns by offenders 
as a result of their lower incentive to commit crime. The likelihood ratio of defensive relative to 
offensive gun holding thus also falls in this case.  
Turning to the alternative policy of enhanced regulations (“taxing guns”) which raises 
either Px, Py or both by equal proportions, we can now show that their impact on gun holding 
will be unambiguous – “more regulations, less guns” as shown by condition (26). This result 
stands in contrast to the impact of enhanced gun regulations in the competitive setting of section 
III, where “taxing guns” produced ambiguous effects on total gun holding (see Proposition 3 and 
footnote 9). The reason is that both offenders and potential victims now react directly, and in a 
complementary manner, to gun holding by the rival group, as both ex and ey > 0. Specifically,   23
when the price of guns faced by the victims group alone, Px, rises, both its direct effect on the 
demand for guns by potential victims, x
*,  and its cross effect on the demand for guns by 
offenders, y
* can be shown to unambiguously lower its desired level, because offenders react 
directly to the fall in x (the market level of r = x/y, is here an endogenous variable). By similar 
reasoning, when Px, alone rises, the equilibrium levels of both x and y, hence total gun holding, 
would fall, d(x
* + y
*)/dP < 0 when dτ = 0. 
The effect of more stringent gun regulation on the crime rate, however, is more complex. 
To see this, let the effectiveness of regulations raise proportionately the full price of guns on both 
potential victims and offenders. The impact of regulations on the population crime rate is then 
found from equation (26) as follows:  
 (27)  ∂q
*/∂P < 0 iff  εy /(1 – ey) > εx /(1 – ex). 
Equation (27) implies that the magnitudes of offenders’ price elasticity of demand for 
guns as well as their elasticity of strategic reactions must exceed those of potential victims. This 
condition is also consistent with the elasticity conditions derived under the purely competitive 
model in section III, requiring that εy > εx.  
Proposition 5.  More stringent gun regulations lower the willingness to hold guns by both 
offenders and potential victims. The effect of regulations on the crime rate, however, is 
ambiguous, depending on the relative price elasticities of demand for guns and the relative 
elasticities of strategic reactions by offenders and potential victims.  
Condition (27) is illustrated in Figure 3. Starting from a benchmark case where ey = ex 
and εy = εx, i.e., we are on the 45-degree line from the origin, and assuming that regulations 
increase the effective price of guns by equal proportions for both offenders and victims, the   24
analysis suggests that a rise in the effective price has no effect on crime. If we deviate from this 
case, however, we can easily see that if εy  /εx is less than 1 and ey/ex  <1, more stringent 
regulations would increase the crime rate, or ∂q
*/∂P > 0. Conversely, when εy /εx exceeds 1 and 
ey/ex >1, more regulations will lower the crime rate, or ∂q
*/∂P < 0. 
B. Strategic reactions as proxies for organizational power 
  Proposition 5 can be illustrated via two special cases: In the first case, potential victims 
are unorganized or “passive” as a group, while offenders are “active” in seeking to control the 
likelihood ratio of defensive gun holding. In the second, potential victims form neighborhood 
patrols groups or volunteer safety organizations, e.g., while offenders are passive. In terms of our 
formal model these two extreme cases can be viewed as involving the following two sets of 
strategic reaction elasticities: a. {ex = 0, ey > 0} when offenders have effective control over the 
neighborhood, in which case imposing stiffer gun regulations would unambiguously lead to more 
crime; and b. {ex > 0, ey = 0} when potential victims have a defensive lock on the neighborhood, 
in which case regulation becomes an effective tool for crime control. More generally, for any 
given value of e y, the higher the value of ex, the more likely is a higher expected penalty on 
offenders or a larger regulatory tax to lower the crime rate (see Figure 3). 
  Furthermore, our model suggests that the elasticities of strategic reactions by offenders 
and victims also generate second-order effects on the efficacy of policies designed to reduce 
crime, by augmenting the magnitude of the change in the crime rate or in gun holding produced 
by stricter law enforcement or gun control. By taking the cross partial derivatives of the crime 
rate or gun holding with respects to ex or ey we obtain the following inferences: 
Proposition 6. The elasticities of strategic response by offenders and potential victims, which   25
can be interpreted as the organizational power of each group, affect not just the direction of 
change in, but also the efficacy of, law enforcement and crime control policies. Specifically, ex 
and ey reinforce the absolute impact of regulation and enforcement policies in a way that benefits 
their respective groups’ interests. (See Figure 3 and equation 29). 
The message of Proposition 6 is that a higher intensity of offenders’ reactions to guns in 
the hands of victims (ey), reflecting offenders’ greater organizational power, will diminish the 
effectiveness of government policies aiming to reduce crime and guns, while a higher intensity of 
potential victims’ reaction to gun holding by offenders (ex), reflecting victims’ organizational 
prowess, will reinforce the effectiveness of government policies that can reduce guns and crime. 
V. Taxing both Guns and Crimes Committed with Guns 
Our formal model has treated crime as a single offense category, say “all crimes against 
property”, or “breaking and entering”, and has recognized just a single sanction to be imposed on 
crime. In reality, harsher penalties are imposed if a gun is used in the course of committing any 
offense, and the law also distinguishes offense categories in which an offender uses a gun (or 
other violent means) to help carry out the offense (e.g., “robbery”), as opposed to other 
categories in which guns are not used (e.g., “burglary”, “larceny”, or “auto theft”). The higher 
social costs associated with the former category call for harsher penalties by virtue of the threat 
to life or use of force involved. This introduces the possibility of employing a third crime control 
policy which taxes both guns (via gun regulations) and “crimes committed with guns” (via 
criminal sanctions), in addition to taxing all offenses”. In the following analysis we consider two 
alternative ways to model such policy. 
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A. Taxing offenders using guns 
To preserve the simple analytical framework pursued in previous sections, we continue to 
recognize a single crime category, say “property crime”, and homogeneous groups of offenders 
and victims, but recognize an expected punishment scheme by which an offense committed with 
the use of guns carries a higher penalty in proportion to the number of guns employed, as follows:  
(28) τ = pf (1  + αy), 
where pf is an expected base penalty applying to all offenses, and α > 0 denotes a surcharge 
imposed if a gun is used (for a similar penalty specification see Rubin and Dezhbakhsh, 2003). 
The implicit assumption is that all offenses within the single crime category require the use of 
guns, but that the intensity, or frequency, of gun use is a choice variable. 
Under the competitive setting of section III, we note that while the surcharge α will reduce 
the demand for guns by offenders, y, as is shown below, the elasticity of y with respect to α must 
be less than 1, because a higher α cannot reduce τ0 – if it did, q will be higher than q0, which 
would indicate an unstable initial equilibrium, as optimal α would then be zero. A higher α must 
therefore increase the effective punishment for crime, τ, and thus reduce the offenders’ demand 
for guns, y, the net profit from crime, π, and the crime rate, q (see equation 17). The fall in y, in 
turn, will raise the likelihood ratio of defensive over offensive gun holding, r. The inference is 
that the demand for guns by potential victims will fall as well, since the demand by potential 
victims is a decreasing function of both the risk of victimization, q, and r (see equation 16).   
By this analysis, a higher surcharge α lowers both the crime rate and total gun holding in the 
population. The effect of more regulation is unambiguous on gun holdings by victims and 
offenders, and therefore on per-capital gun holding as well, (x + y), but it remains ambiguous on   27
the crime rate, q, by Proposition 3. These results mirror those derived in Sections III and IV. 
Under strategic interactions, the preceding inferences about the impact of a surcharge on the 
expected penalty for crimes committed with guns are qualitatively the same as under the 
competitive case. By similar reasoning, a higher α lowers the crime rate and the demand for guns 
by offenders, which in turn lowers the optimal demand for guns by potential victims. A higher α 
thus causes both the crime rate and total gun holding to fall, but the impact of more stringent gun 
regulation on the crime rate remains ambiguous. 
B. Taxing offense categories involving use of guns 
Our model can be further extended to recognize two separate categories of crime within the 
market for offenses: violent crimes committed with guns (“robbery”) and crimes committed 
without guns (“theft”), measured by q1 and q0, respectively. The homogeneous and specialized 
group of offenders can now split their fixed working time between the two crime categories, 
having different differential gains from crime per offense:  
(29)  d1 = d1(x/y), and d0(x), 
This specification captures the fact that only the gain from robbery depends on the likelihood 
ratio of defensive gun holding, r = x/y, whereas the gain from theft would be affected just by the 
likelihood that a potential victim holds a gun. The penalty surcharge specified in equation (28) 
can now be specified more generally as  
(30) (pf)1 = β (pf)0, 
where β > 1 is an implicit surcharge the law enforcement authority imposes to account for the 
greater social cost inflicted by “robbery”. The penalty for “theft”, in turn, will remain just the 
base penalty, pf. 
The difference between this extended case and the simpler case developed in the previous   28
section concerns the substitutability in production of q1 and q0. In an interior competitive 
equilibrium solution, “robbery” and “theft” cannot be perfectly substitutable in production; i.e., 
the production possibilities frontier (PPF) governing offenders’ allocation of the fixed labor time 
between the two crime categories cannot be a straight line. To avoid corner solutions, the PPF 
must be concave toward the origin. In an interior equilibrium, the marginal rate of transformation 
between the two – dq1/dq0 = m(q1, q0) > 0 – is thus rising as q1/q0 falls.  
A higher surcharge on guns held in the commission of robbery, β, will thus always lower the 
equilibrium ratio of q1/q0, lowering the robbery rate while raising the theft rate in the population. 
If theft and robbery were perfect substitutes in production around the equilibrium position, so 
that m = constant = 1, there would be no change in the total incidents of crimes per-capita, 
measured simply as q = q1 + q0, since q0 would increase by the same number of units as the fall 
in q1. More generally, the impact on the total crime rate depends on the aggregation rule for 
counting the different crime categories and computing the marginal rate of transformation. If the 
two crime categories were less than perfect substitutes in production, so m(q1, q 0)  ≠ 1, an 
increase in the penalty surcharge β will also increase, or decrease, the total crime rate measured 
by the incidence of crime if m were less than or greater than 1, respectively. In contrast, if the 
two crime categories were independent in production, then an increase in β will have no impact 
on “theft”, but “robbery” and the total crime rate would necessarily fall when the penalty 
surcharge increases. 
As for the impact of a uniform regulation tax, its direct effect on the robbery rate will be 
qualitatively the same as that predicted in propositions II and V: it would be ambiguous under 
both competition and startegic interactions. The direct effects of the uniform regulatory tax on 
the theft rate, in contrast, would be unambiguous: since regulation in this case affects just   29
potential victims, as theft by definition does not involve the use of guns or threats, a higher 
effective price of guns purchased by law abiders, Px , will lower the equilibrium gun holding by 
potential victims and unambiguously raise the theft rate. This assymetry can further induce 
offenders’ to substitute time away from robbery toward theft, assuming that the two crime 
categories are substitues in production. The final impact on the combined crime rates, or “total 
property crime count” will still remain ambiguous: it depends both on the strength of the 
opposing substitution effects and the marginal rate of technical transformation, m, governing the 
numerical terms of trade between robbery and theft . 
Conclusion 
  The interaction between offenders and potential victims of crime has so far received 
relatively little attention in the theoretical literature on the economics of crime. The virtual 
“market for offenses” model seems to be the relevant analytical framework for addressing such 
interaction and fleshing out its implications for optimal crime control policies. The main 
objective of this paper has been twofold: to extend the market model to deal with both “product” 
and “factor” markets; and to apply it to the case where guns are used for crime commission by 
offenders and for providing private self-protection by potential victims. Our analysis offers new 
insights about the association between crime and guns or related weapons, and the limits it 
imposes on the efficacy of law enforcement and regulatory policies aimed to control both crime 
and guns.   
  The main insights are that under a competitive market setting, in which both offenders 
and victims behave independently, gun regulations may have ambiguous effects on both gun 
holding and the incidence of crime in the population, to the extent that it raises the full price of 
guns for both offenders and victims. In contrast, law enforcement policies involving criminal   30
sanctions unambiguously reduce both the frequency of the sanction-related crimes, as well as 
gun holding by both  offenders and potential victims. A critical assumption leading to these 
propositions is that guns serve as both means of self-protection by potential victims, which lower 
the probability of becoming victims of crime, and as factors of production for offenders, which 
enhance their expected gain from committing offenses. The equilibrium ratio of gun holding by 
victims relative to offenders, or the likelihood ratio of defensive over offensive guns, affects both 
the incidence of crime and the distribution of private gains and losses from crime.  
In the competitive setting, both offenders and victims behave independently and take the 
equilibrium ratio of defensive over offensive gun holding as given while making decisions about 
acquiring guns. The market may also be “organized”, however, in the sense that offenders 
(through gangs) or potential victims (through neighborhood watches, patrols, and other 
community actions) can directly affect the equilibrium ratio of defensive over offensive guns in 
the population. By allowing for strategic interactions between victims and offenders, we reaffirm 
the proposition that crime control policies through stiffer law enforcement can unambiguously 
lower the incidence of both crime and gun holding in the population, as well as the relative need 
of potential victims to hold guns (the ratio of defensive gun holding in the population). Likewise, 
the effects of regulation on gun holding by both offenders and potential victims are unambiguous 
in this case. However, the effects of gun regulation on the crime rate remain ambiguous in this 
case as well. Furthermore, relative organizational power by offenders or victims affects the 
efficacy of law enforcement or gun regulations in a direction that is more beneficial to their 
constituent groups.  
While our analysis focuses on deriving policy implications concerning crime and gun 
controls, it also offers some lessons concerning the design and interpretation of empirical   31
investigations concerning the association between crime and guns. The recent empirical literature 
on the impact of stiffening or relaxing gun control regulations alluded to in the introduction has 
spawned an intense debate about whether less regulation (more guns) lead to more crime, or vice 
versa (see, e.g., Lott, 2001, and Duggan, 2001). Our analysis offers a possible reconciliation of 
conflicting empirical findings, since by our analysis the answer depends on the relative 
magnitudes of price elasticities of demand for guns as well as the relative magnitudes of strategic 
reactions by offenders and victims under non-competitive market conditions whereby offenders 
or potential victims can form group responses. While data on gang activity and neighborhood 
patrol groups are not readily available, they are nevertheless relevant for isolating the impact of 
gun and crime control policies in connection with specific crime categories or geographical 
locations that are known to be subject to organized activity by either side. 
Related insights concern the design of empirical tests. Empirical findings may be 
consistent with the hypothesis of “less guns – less crime” not because of the effect of regulation, 
but because of more severe law enforcement policies which raise the expected punishment for 
crime. Empirical investigations into the relation between gun regulations and crime need to be 
conditional on a full accounting of criminal sanctions for which data are typically incomplete. 
While studies typically control for the probability of arrest and imprisonment, data are generally 
not available about the severity of the penalties imposed upon conviction. It is thus important to 
fully control for all the components of public law enforcement when estimating the hypothesized 
effect of gun control policies on crime.  
Furthermore, by our analysis in section V, where we recognize harsher penalties on 
offenders using guns, or on crime categories that are committed with guns (“Robbery”) rather 
than without guns, (“Theft”), stiffer penalty surcharges for crimes involving guns unambiguously   32
reduce the incidence of robbery (or other violent crimes) relative to theft, or the fraction of all 
crimes committed with guns. However, they may also result in a higher incidence of “theft”, if 
robbery and theft were substitutes in “production”, and they may even increase the total crime 
count, depending on the marginal rate of transformation, m(q1, q2), between robbery and theft. 
An increase in the base penalty applying to all crime categories, however, will reduce the total 
incidence of crime.  
Similar insights apply to the impact of gun regulations that are applied uniformly on all 
gun markets. Stiffer gun regulations in this case would have ambiguous effects on robbery, but 
will unambiguously increase the incidence of “theft”. Our analysis suggests that in studying the 
impact of both gun control and crime control policies, a distinction should be drawn between 
crime categories that by definition involve the use of guns and those that do not.  
These inferences bring us back to the underlying theme of this paper: the importance of 
reliance on the economic theory of crime in designing empirical investigations of the role of 
policy variables and in interpreting apparently conflicting findings about their efficacy. The 
virtual market setting we develop in this paper may also be useful in addressing other policy 
issues where the interaction between offenders and potential victims is a key component of the 
analysis. 
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Figure 1: Illustration of equilibrium in the market for offenses 
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Figure 2: Existence and stability of the strategic equilibrium 
 
Figure 3: Effectiveness of regulation under alternative price and strategic reaction elasticities   36
Notes  
 
                                                 
1  We are not modeling here “self-protection” by offenders, which typically involves legal 
defense to avoid conviction and punishment. In the next section, however, we model explicitly 
the direct cost c in equation (2), which offenders undertake to increase the expect loot. 
2 Note that C stands for the direct costs of apprehending, charging, and prosecuting offenders, 
which determines the probability of punishment, p. In Becker, (1968) and Ehrlich (1981) this 
component is therefore specified as C(q,  p). Since τ=pf is here the sole instrument of 
enforcement, we define all components of the social loss function as functions of this variable. 
3 It is possible that a secondary motive for offenders to hold guns is to self-protect themselves 
from the probability of being victimized by other offenders. We abstract from this offender-on-
offender crime risk in this competitive market setting, on the assumption that to offenders, the 
dominant motive for holding guns is offensive. 
4 Cook et al., (2007) provide some evidence on gun prices, which also imply that the used guns 
market may be thin. Our treatment of both markets as competitive is done for convenience.  
5 The assumption implies, implicitly, that guns in the hands of offenders or victims who choose 
to hold them are as effective in elasticity terms in raising or lowering the differential return to 
offenders, d = (wi – wl), or potential loss to victims, wi , per offense. Note, however, that the level 
or elasticity of demand for guns by offenders vs. victims could be quite different (see footnote 6). 
6  Public law enforcement (police) and private self-protection are taken to be independent in 
production on the simplifying assumption that changes enforcement (or use of guns by police) do 
not affect the productivity or full unit costs of guns to offenders and victims. The demand 
functions Gx and Gy in equations (16) and (17) are different, as they also reflect the roles of 
different substitutes to guns as means of production (to offenders) or self-protection (to victims). 
7 The differential gain in section II was defined as d = (wi – wl) – c, which we now separate more 
generally to wi – wl and Py, but for convenience we will continue to refer to the differential loot 
in this section as d = wi – wl. Note that q is not an argument in equation (16) because we maintain 
complete separation between offenders and potential victims. Put differently, we implicitly 
assume that offenders demand guns strictly for the purpose of committing successful crimes, not 
as self-protection against the risk of victimization, which they produce.  
8 The reason is that ( – ex,r + ey,r) can be non-zero iff the ratio r = x/y is changing. But in order for 
r to change upward or downward, the numerator must change by a larger percentage than the 
denominator. Thus – ex,r must exceed ey,r .   This condition is also sufficient to assure the stability 
of an interior solution for r
*, which is (1– ex,r + ey,r – ex,qeq,r) > 0, since – ex,qeq,r > 0. 
9  By (16) and (17) we get dx
*/x
*|dP=0 = ex,q dq
*/q




*|dP=0 = ey,τ dτ/τ  + ey,r dr
*/r
*, 




*|dP=0 and rearranging terms 
we can then show that dx
*/x
*|dP=0 < 0 and dy
*/y
*|dP=0 < 0. 
10 The condition for d(x
* + y
*)/dP to be negative in sign is –ey,r / (1 – ex, r – ex,q eq,r) < εy /εx. 